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Research Note 
 
The Downside of Indonesia’s Successful 
Liberal Democratisation and the Way 
Ahead. Notes from the Participatory  
Surveys and Case Studies 2000–2016 
Olle Törnquist  
with Hasrul Hanif, Eric Hiariej, Willy P. Samadhi and Amalin-
da Savirani 
Abstract: Indonesia is a critical case of liberal democratisation. Most of 
the country’s old dominant actors were included in compromises aimed 
at democracy and were expected to become democrats by adjusting to 
the new institutions. The pro-democrats were expected to propel change 
from civil society. However, the recurrent participatory surveys and 
follow-up studies summarised herein point to remarkable freedoms, 
along with deplorable governance and representation. The major causes 
are biased institutions of representation, plus weak political capacity of 
the crucial actors of change within modern business and among the 
middle classes and labourers. Advances presuppose new ways to repre-
sent their interests.  
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Introduction 
By August 1998, three months after the Indonesian autocrat Suharto 
stepped down amidst economic crisis and student-led pro-democracy 
demonstrations, leading scholars and experts were brought together in 
Jakarta by the Institute of Sciences and the Ford Foundation to discuss 
how democracy might be crafted (Liddle 2001). Responding to sceptics 
who worried about the applicability of the liberal model of agreements 
among the elite with roots in Spain and Latin America, comparativists 
concluded: “we just give you the framework, you fill it in”.1 This is in-
deed what would happen. Two months later, moderate leaders turned 
down the pro-democracy activists’ idea of a transitional government, 
opening up instead for quick elections. By implication, only the leaders, 
parties and socio-religious organisations that had coexisted with Suharto 
stood a fair chance to gain representation. Principled pro-democrats 
were advised to either align themselves with the old mainstream or to be 
active in civil society. The assumption was that the old leaders would 
become democrats when adjusting to the new institutions and that civil 
society would act from below to improve the system. 
From the liberal point of view, this framework proved remarkably 
successful. Larry Diamond has shown, based on broad comparative 
surveys, that Indonesia is a success case, aside from persistent corruption 
and poor rule of law (Diamond 2010). Advances include demilitarisation, 
reduced communal conflicts and separatism, more liberties, vibrant elec-
tions, and extensive civil society. David Horowitz has argued, moreover, 
that one reason for Indonesia’s success is that the decisive actors have 
been accommodated through laudable institutional design (Horowitz 
2013). 
However, given that the largest of the world’s new democracies is a 
celebrated test case for the liberal model, a critical question is how the 
pro-democrats that were side-lined after the fall of Suharto interpreted 
the dynamics. Have they anything to add? 
Many of the dissidents dropped out, while others linked up with the 
established actors and were absorbed by mainstream politics. However, a 
majority joined civil society and negated ‘crook politics’. Some of the 
latter dissidents subscribed to the arguments that democracy is a naïve 
endeavour as long as the state and its politics are dominated by oligarchs, 
or as long as politics and the judiciary are ridden by corruption.2 Howev-
                                                 
1  Expressed by Alfred Stepan. (Törnquist’s notes from the meeting). 
2  For example, with references, in the first case, to Robison and Hadiz 2013, and 
in the second case to the more general arguments of Fukuyama 2014. 
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er, others searched for alternatives. For example, concerned researchers 
and investigative journalists, along with reflective activists, revisited the 
state of the democracy movement. Their major conclusion was that most 
groups were short of social and political foundations, almost as ‘floating’ 
as ordinary people were made to be under the Suharto dictatorship (Pra-
setyo, Priyono, and Törnquist 2003). Hence it was high time to ‘go poli-
tics’ again. But what were the problems and options?  
To answer this questions, the researchers took David Beetham’s 
framework for assessing the quality of liberal democratic institutions as a 
point of departure (Beetham et al. 2002), adding questions of special 
importance to deliberative and social democratic perspectives. Thereafter, 
all indicators were condensed as a way of providing space for analyses of 
democratisation. Hence, two sets of factors were added. The first set 
involved identifying (i) the major mainstream actors that had co-existed 
with Suharto and (ii) the principled pro-democrats, who were labelled as 
‘dominant’ and ‘alternative’ actors as time passed. The second set com-
prised analyses of these actors’ willingness and capacity to foster the 
democratic rules and develop democratic policies (for details and evalua-
tion, Törnquist 2013). These additional variables were not included in 
order to invite statistical analysis but to test crucial arguments about 
whether and how further democratisation would come about, such as the 
character of citizenship, the scope of public affairs, the ability to put 
issues on the agenda, to mobilise and organise people, and to foster 
representation.  
Similarly, the study did not identify any statistical samples of re-
spondents, relying instead on the possibly best grounded experts on 
democratisation in various sectors around the country. This was done 
with strict principles of merit and in consultation with publicly identified 
democracy groups and key informants. Thereby, it was possible to con-
duct three rounds of interviews (each time) with between 700 and 900 
experts on the basis of about 60 questions (with numerous alternative 
answers and comments) from 2003 till 2013. The results were then sup-
plemented by case studies of the most crucial issues and deliberated with 
the informants. All kinds of challenges were involved, but the number of 
drop-outs was remarkably low, despite the highly time-consuming inter-
views, and there was no major critique of misrepresentation beyond valid 
points on insufficient inclusion of female activists and union leaders 
among the informants. Moreover, in contrast to the often-hyped state-
ments by pundits in metropolitan media, the fear of biased answers from 
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pro-democracy informants came to nothing in face of their cautious and 
self-critical answers.3  
All major results and data are now available for further analyses 
(Priyono, Samadhi, and Törnquist 2007; Samadhi and Warouw 2009; 
Savirani and Törnquist 2015), and a number of case studies are out or on 
their way.4 However, in view of Indonesia’s importance in the general 
discussion about the problems of democracy, some of the main conclu-
sions may be of wider interest. 
More Freedoms than Democratic Governance 
There is little doubt about Indonesia’s liberal advances; the pro-demo-
crats themselves confirm them. However, there are a number of qualifi-
cations. For example, case studies reveal that freedom of assembly and 
expression are upheld selectively; that citizen rights are used by sectarian 
groups and ‘task forces’ that do not respect the rights of others; that the 
suppression in school and public life of the history of crimes against 
humanity holds back civil rights and democracy; and that the situation 
remains deplorable in parts of West Papua, Central Sulawesi and Aceh in 
particular. However, the general assessments are positive, especially with 
regard to the freedom of speech and organisation, which now only 9 per 
cent of the informants deem bad rather than fair or good. Almost the 
same applies to equal citizenship and human rights, which only 18 per 
cent of informants consider to be bad. Moreover, even the pro-
democracy informants say that democratic rules and regulation are not 
only supported by some 61 per cent of the alternative actors but also by 
approximately 48 per cent of the dominant actors. The serious abusers 
are down to 7 per cent of the alternative actors and 29 per cent of the 
dominant (Savirani and Törnquist 2015: Tables 3.1, 3.6 and 3.7). So, thus 
defined, democracy seems to be ‘the only game in town’, and the liberal 
strategy of fostering elite compromises in support of democratic rules 
and regulations has no doubt been valid.  
                                                 
3  The research was funded initially by the Norwegian and Swedish international 
development agencies, Ford Foundation and the University of Oslo in coop-
eration with Indonesian democracy organisations; later on by the Norwegian 
Embassy to Indonesia in additional cooperation with the University of Gadjah 
Mada. 
4  Including Priyono and Nur 2009; Törnquist, Tharakan, and Quimpo 2009; 
Törnquist, Prasetyo, and Birks 2011; Samhadi 2015; Djani and Törnquist 2016; 
and Hiariej and Stokke (forthcoming) 2017. All survey data are available at 
<http://pwd.polgov.id/> (6 April 2017). 
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However, the grounded experts also affirm the mainstream assess-
ment that governance is lagging behind. Approximately one-third of the 
informants deem the level of rule of law, equal rights to justice, and im-
partial governance to be particularly bad, and a similar figure applies to 
the quality of parties and elections (Savirani and Törnquist 2015: Table 
3.1). Most actors seem to have appreciated freedoms but not democratic 
governance. While the informants have become increasingly positive 
over the years, they now also point to stagnation: 60 per cent say that the 
various democratic institutions have not improved or have become 
worse between 2009 and 2013 (Savirani and Törnquist 2015: Table 3.3). 
In other words, the liberal assumptions that institutions are so crucial 
that adherence to them would make mainstream actors democratic and 
that liberties and stronger civil society would generate progress are now 
in doubt. How can this be explained? 
The Accommodation Dilemma 
The informants’ initial answer to the above question is that the first pillar 
in the liberal model of fostering compromises within the elite, and thus 
also including the most powerful actors, has generated both stability and 
problems. In short, the informants support the thesis of leading scholars 
of Indonesian politics, such as Edward Aspinall, that there is an “irony 
of success”; that is, that the price for achievements is that the main po-
tential adversaries (the military, oligarchs, ethnoregional elites, and mili-
tant Islamists) have been accommodated into the system along with 
patronage and corruption (Aspinall 2010: 20–34; c.f. Törnquist 2001). 
Generally, while physical force is no longer a decisive source of political 
authority and legitimacy for the dominant actors (fewer than 10 per cent 
of the informants’ responses), money and ‘good contacts’ have become 
increasingly important (about 46 and 32 per cent, respectively) (Savirani 
and Törnquist 2015: 76–77). For example, according to the informants, 
almost 60 per cent of the dominant actors that are elected public officials 
own or operate large business (Savirani and Törnquist 2015: 59).  
However, the informants also state that most dominant actors do 
not have roots in Suharto’s regime (only about 26 per cent). Instead, 
most of them seem to be of more recent origin, sometimes with a back-
ground in civil society organisations (Savirani and Törnquist 2015: Table 
4.3). Similarly, as Marcus Mietzner has stressed, some potentially pro-
gressive actors have penetrated parties and public administration (Mietz-
ner 2013). Hence, the accommodation of the powerful actors and the 
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importance of what some scholars have called ‘oligarch democracy’ may 
not be the only explanations for the problems.  
Unfair Institutions of Representation 
The informants’ supplementary answer to why democratic institutions, 
new actors, and civil society are not doing better is that the existing par-
ties and widespread free and fair elections, along with many participatory 
practices, are not only dominated by the most powerful actors. They 
typically also fail to open up for fair representation of progressive inter-
ests and collective actors. The informants point to some improvements, 
but the common estimates are almost as negative as those of the quality 
of rule of law and impartial governance. Citizen participation is deemed 
particularly bad, but so too are interest- and issue-based representation 
(Savirani and Törnquist 2015: Tables 3.1, 3.3 and 90–94). Thus, the fre-
quent results from other studies and media reporting about crooked 
politicians and elitist parties, vote buying, patronage, and clientelism are 
confirmed (most recently, Aspinall and Sukmajati 2016).  
Our case studies also stress that people without good formal educa-
tion are barred from running as candidates, even locally and even though 
they may be experienced and knowledgeable. Likewise, active civil serv-
ants (including teachers) remain prevented from candidacy, even though 
their subordination to authoritarian regimes has been reduced and partic-
ipation could be combined with strict rules on impartiality at work. This 
certainly stands in contrast to the dominance of actors from business 
and private organisations with their own special interests. Moreover, the 
conditions for parties to be allowed to participate in elections remain 
extremely stringent. Although the mission of consolidating a unified 
political system in the country has been accomplished, parties wanting to 
field a candidate, even in local elections, are still required to demonstrate 
a physical presence in the country at large.5 For those parties without 
massive economic resources and exceptionally ‘good contacts’, it is next 
to impossible to build a party and participate in elections in Indonesia, 
especially with an alternative democratic party.6 The exception to allow 
                                                 
5  A party must have chapters in all provinces, in 75 per cent of the regencies/ 
municipalities in each province, and in 50 per cent of the districts within each 
regency/municipality. 
6  Progressive, young, middle-class liberals in Jakarta, with interests in Singapore-
an urban management and certain social democratic ideas, might succeed in 
mobilising sufficient financial support to establish chapters of their new Indo-
nesian Solidarity Party (PSI). They may also be able to effectively convey their 
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local parties in Aceh, as part of the internationally brokered peace accord 
in 2005, served to facilitate the country’s unification, but the democratic 
opening was soon undermined without significant critique from liberals 
inside and outside the country. As reformists advanced within the new 
democratic space, the conservative former-rebel leaders were given spe-
cial benefits that undermined their reformist opponents in return for 
abstaining from resuming armed struggle and for mobilising votes for 
the president and his party in the national elections (Törnquist, Prasetyo, 
and Birks 2011).  
Instead, the main liberal strategy has been to introduce individual 
candidates in the context of party lists and to promote direct elections of 
political executives. The effect of this has been increasingly personality-
oriented money politics. Only a few progressive candidates have been 
elected as members of mainstream parties and to the powerless Regional 
Representative Council and also as village leaders, regents, mayors, and 
governors. However, the particular challenge of winning direct elections 
for political executives by way of traditional individually oriented patron-
age has given rise to what James Manor has identified as “post-clientelist” 
methods. In Indonesia, this has mainly occurred by way of populism, 
including by gaining personal popularity as being against the establish-
ment, and by building supposedly direct relations with broad unspecified 
sections of the population (Manor 2013). These efforts have no doubt 
opened up new avenues for alternative actors that can help provide pop-
ularity and popular support, as in the case of activists’ cooperation with 
the current reform-oriented president Joko ‘Jokowi’ Widodo, but also for 
conservative and religious leaders, as well as for established parties that 
may rally behind popular independent candidates. Moreover, in both 
cases there are few if any democratic institutions for representation and 
negotiations (Djani and Törnquist 2016). We shall return to the implica-
tions later.  
Meanwhile Suharto’s state-corporatist system of top-down appoint-
ed and thoroughly controlled ‘functional groups’ was effectively broken 
down. However, the results of the attempts to instead promote direct 
participation at the local level have been mixed. The typical critique is of 
elite dominance, even in the context of the new village-level governance 
reforms (most recently, for example, White 2016). There have also been 
exciting attempts to initiate commissions and central and local advisory 
boards on issues such as corruption, human rights, and planning. These 
                                                                                                    
bold female leadership profile and to efficiently exploit their media skills and 
contacts within polling institutes. However, their lack of a popular base and 
transformative policies remains unresolved. 
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are potentially important institutionalised linkages between state and 
society that add to general elections and may weaken the importance of 
‘good contacts’. A major conclusion in this essay is that they should be 
expanded but also democratised. This is because the members tend to be 
selected in their individual capacities and appointed in accordance with 
the vested interests of the parliamentarians and executive politicians. 
Hence, the members cannot act as representatives of democratic issue 
and interest organisations and other communities (Savirani and Törn-
quist 2015: 109–113, incl. Table 6.3). 
Weak Democratic Capacity 
The informants’ third answer to the question of why democratisation has 
stalled is that the freedoms and emphasis on decentralisation and civil 
society (of which there is little doubt) have not significantly improved 
the political capacity of potentially progressive actors. The more recent 
movements in response to the uneven economic development point to 
advances in terms of collective action, but also come with problems of 
populism.  
While the dominant actors are able to rely on superior economic re-
sources and ‘good contacts’, the alternative actors have rarely developed 
any collective counter-powers, such as protests and mass organisation, 
and have instead relied on culture and knowledge. Moreover, the im-
portance of the latter has been reduced (from 37 per cent of the re-
sponses in 2009 to 25 per cent in 2013); and the roles of ‘good contacts’ 
and economic resources have increased (from 32 to 52 per cent and 10 
to 15 per cent, respectively) (Savirani and Törnquist 2015: 76–77).  
Similarly, the dominant actors have sustained their ability to decide 
the political agenda with wide sets of values, issues, and general promises. 
By contrast, the alternative actors retreated in 1999 from their previous 
overall focus on resisting the Suharto regime. This was often done on 
the basis of a combination of class interests and demands for democracy 
(Budiman and Törnquist 2001). They now turned to anti-state and self-
management in civil society, plus advocacy and campaigns on single 
issues such as human rights, gender, governance (including corruption), 
the environment, and separate attention to the plight of farmers, urban 
poor, and workers (Prasetyo, Priyono, and Törnquist 2003). Much of this 
tendency is still present, as is the lack of long-term policies for gradual 
transformation (Savirani and Törnquist 2015: 77–89; Djani and Törn-
quist 2016). However, there has been one crucial change since the sec-
ond survey. The previously strong emphasis on the above-mentioned 
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single issues and focus on self-help and self-management has given way 
to greater emphasis on welfare issues and quests for public governance. 
Now, 55 per cent of the informants say that social welfare such as health 
and education are the most important public matters, while governance 
scores 30 per cent and citizenship 14 per cent. Moreover, 66 per cent say 
that state and local government rather than private actors should manage 
the welfare issues (Savirani and Törnquist 2015: 23–26, incl. Graph 2.1). 
Similarly, according to the informants, the most important figures also 
focus on welfare, especially the dominant actors (40 per cent of respons-
es), but also the alternative (33 per cent). The alternative actors’ preoc-
cupation with human rights and governance has dropped to 22 and 14 
per cent respectively (Savirani and Törnquist 2015: Table 5.2). Interest-
ingly, however, politicians, along with state and local government, do not 
seem to deliver based on the respondents’ indications that they deal with 
their problems more through citizens’ own engagement and, for example, 
socio-religious organisations (Savirani and Törnquist 2015: 26).  
Our case studies also point in this direction (Savirani and Törnquist 
2015: 83–87; Djani and Törnquist 2016; Hiariej and Stokke forthcoming 
2017; and Samhadi 2015). There are signs of counter movement against 
the drawbacks of the uneven economic development and deficits of 
public welfare and services. Most of the activists who used to negate the 
state and ‘dirty politics’ and celebrated the liberal emphasis on civil socie-
ty and self-management now ask politicians and governments to consid-
er more decent wages, the development of a welfare state, and environ-
mentally responsible compromises in order to handle chaotic urban 
growth. The best illustration is the successful broad alliance between 
2010 and 2012 for a universal public health reform among unions and 
civil society organisations, together with urban poor and informal la-
bourers as well as supportive politicians. Similarly, President Jokowi 
advanced largely thanks to efforts regarding public welfare and urban 
development, while also negotiating with urban poor organisations.  
However, other populist-oriented politicians have also attempted 
similar methods of attracting broad support, often by employing transac-
tional money politics and by exploiting religious identities. So, in spite of 
the growing importance of demands for public welfare, the dominant 
politicians have managed to stay in command and retain hegemony, 
whereas the movements based on popular interest and activists have 
remained short of alternatives and are tailing behind. In fact, the alterna-
tive actors’ capacity to develop long-term policies remains weak, so the 
struggles for the health reform have not continued, in favour of more 
comprehensive welfare policies. 
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The previous focus on single issues tends to be associated with 
methods of mobilising people such as lobbying and networking, plus 
alternative patronage of vulnerable people, rather than broad member-
ship-based organisations. However, the increasing focus on the interests 
of labour in particular, as well as social rights and welfare have come 
with greater mobilisation and organisation in this sector and behind 
populist-oriented politicians and their parties (Savirani and Törnquist 
2015: 83–90, incl. Table 5.4B). Frequent methods include populism, 
mainly characterised by anti-elitism and supposedly direct relations be-
tween charismatic leaders and notoriously undefined ‘people’. This is 
most common among dominant actors (59 per cent) but also with alter-
native actors (41 per cent). Meanwhile clientelism and patronage are still 
in use (17 and 24 per cent for dominant and alternative actors, respec-
tively), as is networking (6 per cent for dominant and 10 per cent for 
alternative actors); but movement coordination is trailing behind (4 per 
cent for dominant and 9 per cent for alternative actors). Related infor-
mation adds the role of social media and confirms the limited im-
portance of organisation as compared to mobilisation (Savirani and 
Törnquist 2015: Tables 5.4 and 5.4A). For example, only 5 per cent of 
the actors generally turn to democratic organisations or institutions as a 
means of overcoming problems of exclusion (Savirani and Törnquist 
2015: 74 and Table 5.1).  
The grounded informants’ experiences are particularly worrying 
when it comes to the alternative actors’ strategies and related means of 
representation to gain influence and foster policies (Savirani and Törn-
quist 2015: 66, 81, 99 and 102–116). The main method for addressing 
problems is still to turn to institutions of self-governance and private 
governance (51 per cent of responses). It is true that actors also turn to 
institutions for stakeholders to advance their claims (24 per cent) and to 
the judiciary (10 per cent), but these face problems of representation and 
corruption, and the political institutions are tailing behind (10 per cent) 
(Savirani and Törnquist 2015: Table 6.3 (percentage of responses)). In 
terms of mediators, moreover, civil society organisations and media 
remain at the top (49 per cent), along with informal leaders (13 per cent), 
while interest organisations and political organisations come far behind 
(between 10 and 12 per cent each) (Savirani and Törnquist 2015: Table 
6.4 (per cent of responses)).  
To put it bluntly, the main strategy seems to be to establish linkages 
with friends in influential positions rather than with people with similar 
problems. Strategies to widen one’s base come to 24 per cent, while 
campaigning via media, advocacy, and lobbying totals 44 per cent (Savi-
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rani and Törnquist 2015: Table 6.5 (percentage of responses)). In short, 
the major effect of liberal democratisation is that there are few reformist 
strategies in the first place; that is, plans for stepwise advances such as 
building an alliance in order to promote a particular public reform, which 
in turn may enable a wider coalition of actors to implement a follow-up 
reform that may promote more inclusive development, better welfare 
systems, improved education, and greater democracy.7  
Instead, most of our informants instead conceptualise strategies in 
terms of calculations of how to gain the best-possible contacts within 
state and politics, in order to gain access to influential political positions 
and as many public resources as possible in an effort to foster their own 
interests, projects, and organisations outside the state and government. 
In short, the idea of developing reform proposals and mobilising the 
widest possible support for them, and for their impartial implementation 
through improved state and government services, seems to be almost 
absent among alternative actors. Under liberal democratisation, most 
alternative actors are simply so weak that the rational prime focus is 
lobbying and ‘getting access’ to resources for their activities outside the 
state and government, rather than trying to win elections or building 
mass organisations and broad alliances.  
The Way Ahead 
In conclusion, it is true that advances have been made during recent 
years, mainly in the context of the broad alliance of unions, civil society 
organisations, and progressive politicians for public health reform. There 
has also been mobilisation behind and in favour of reformist populists 
like Jokowi, mainly along his route to the presidential palace, less when 
in office. In fact, our empirical studies indicate that the so-far fragment-
ed and weak actors of change in Indonesia might be able to build the 
kind of broader counter-movements against the tortuous liberal econom-
ic development that Karl Polanyi identified during the 1930s. The chaot-
ic urban growth has fostered compromises between sections of business, 
middle classes, and urban poor. Many of these sections wish to build 
more liveable cities by fighting capital accumulation based on dispos-
sessing citizens of land and other resources rather than on production. 
The best-known cooperation was brokered by Jokowi in Solo on Central 
Java and in Jakarta before he was elected president. Moreover, some 
                                                 
7  For related discussions of gradualism and transformative politics, see Carothers 
2007: 12–14, and Stokke and Törnquist 2013. 
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organised workers have started to realise the need to link up with the 
growing number of contract and self-employed labourers in order to 
avoid losing out under the global reign of flexibility and subcontracting 
but still stand a chance when fighting for more and decent jobs and 
better welfare schemes. This was the background for the broad move-
ment for the national public health insurance. Numerous middle-class 
people who work under precarious conditions are also concerned and in 
favour of public welfare. Their willingness to pay taxes for such services 
(instead of seeking private solutions) certainly presupposes trust in actors 
advocating effective and impartial public administration. However, the 
same demand for impartial public administration also applies to the coa-
litions for liveable cities, as well as to the wider alliances among labourers 
in favour of better work and welfare schemes. Therefore, all these 
movements may add demands for better governance (Djani and Törn-
quist 2016). The signs of such potentials in Indonesia are somewhat 
similar to the recent dynamics that carried the Indian Common People’s 
Party (AAP) into local government in New Delhi (for further analyses 
and references, see Törnquist and Harriss 2016). Most importantly, such 
broad unity in favour of well-implemented reforms towards decent work 
relations and welfare may foster wider and better-organised collective 
action. Well-organised actors, in turn, are a fundamental element in 
democratic routes to economic improvements through the historical 
social-growth pacts that preceded comprehensive welfare states.  
As concluded in a recent study on Reinventing Social Democratic Devel-
opment (see Törnquist and Harriss 2016), the above would thus be an 
upside-down scenario. By way of comparison, the Scandinavian history 
of broad labour movements countered the global economic crises via 
pre-Keynesian public works and investments, and then engaged in social-
growth pacts between well-organised representatives of capital and la-
bour, which generated capacity and interest (even among employers) in 
welfare reforms that also fostered economic development. In contrast, 
the possible scenario in countries in the Global South, where uneven 
development prevails and organisation is weak and fragmented, is that 
more extensive struggles for rights, welfare, and impartial implementa-
tion pave the way for unified strong organisations and social growth 
pacts.  
However, the basic problem for alternative actors is still building 
such broad alliances and then sustaining them. Moreover, the actors 
remain fragmented because of poor popular- and interest-based repre-
sentation. As previously noted, this makes it more rational for actors to 
gain access to good contacts and resources within state and government 
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(and the private sector), rather than mobilising and organising as many as 
possible behind joint demands and public policies that could, in a step-
by-step manner, improve democracy and people’s capacity to use it, and 
to foster social equality combined with inclusive and sustainable eco-
nomic growth (see also the insightful analysis in Aspinall 2013: 27–54).  
Hence, there must be more institutions of representation that foster 
democratic collective action behind long-term gradual policies to trans-
form the troublesome conditions. The present actors in control of deci-
sions on electoral reforms have their own fingers in the pie and are un-
likely to proceed. Instead, progress appears to require more social as-
pects of democratisation and better representation of those interests that 
have historically proven more engaged in fostering equal inclusive devel-
opment.  
In short, the coordinators of the participatory research conclude 
that the main priority of democratisation should now be the promotion 
of social democratic representation of issue and interest groups to com-
plement liberal democratic elections and direct citizen participation. As 
already mentioned, an initial step in this direction could be to demand 
democratisation of the current commissions and central and local advi-
sory boards that have so far involved top-down selected civil society 
leaders. There is also a need to expand the institutions by including 
democratic unions, employers’ associations, and civil society organisa-
tions in the development and implementation of reforms towards effec-
tive governance and welfare schemes that promote inclusive develop-
ment. The policy areas are a matter of priority and must certainly be 
decided by politicians elected on the basis of citizens’ preferences. How-
ever, Suharto’s top-down appointment of delegates, as well as the cur-
rent selection in accordance with the vested interests of crooked politi-
cians, should be replaced by impartial and transparent public facilitation 
of representatives selected by and accountable to those who build na-
tion-wide democratic issue and interest organisations.  
A step in the right direction is that the civil society organisations 
that advise President Jokowi’s chief of staff, Teten Masduki, have been 
allowed to appoint their own representatives. However, popular mass 
organisations remain on the outside. Further sources of inspiration may 
include the possibilities to widen the International Labour Organization’s 
principles of tripartite labour market negotiations to other sectors and 
actors. The democratic representation of the crucial but neglected issues 
and interests may also address the abuse of powers among politicians 
and bureaucrats, as well as enhance the political capacity of actors of 
change. But would this be politically feasible in Indonesia? 
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Reform-oriented leaders who are less elitist, such as Jokowi, need 
support from not just powerful actors but also citizen organisation, un-
ions and other interest organisations. As we have seen, there are signs 
that these citizens’ and workers’ and other interest organisations can 
come together regarding demands for decent work relations, welfare 
reforms, and efficient and fair implementation of related services. The 
crucial question that requires more research is whether they can also 
agree on demanding democratic representation in the development and 
implementation of such policies (to thus also increase their own capacity), 
and whether political leaders and employers with an interest in inclusive 
development would then realise that such agreements might also be in 
their favour. This has not yet materialised. For the time being, political 
leaders such as Jokowi’s ally, the present governor of Jakarta (Basuki 
Tjahaja ‘Ahok’ Purnama), have downgraded the importance of negotiat-
ing with the urban poor, thereby opening up for other powerful politi-
cians and even Muslim extremists to gain their support. Also, potentially 
progressive actors, such as unions, have returned to transactional politics 
and rallied behind the leaders that promise the best patronage in return 
for popular support with whatever means, at worst engaging in religious 
identity politics.  
Internationally, support for the alternative route may be provided 
by development, labour, and prodemocracy organisations in favour of 
broad agendas and agreements. Such partnerships do not need to be 
politically partisan in favour of particular parties. (But later on, of course, 
democratically stronger issue and interest organisations are also the best 
base for the development of less elitist and oligarch-driven parties.) In 
terms of democracy studies, we believe in waiting for a while before 
making significant assessments (such as ours) and correlations of factors 
involved. Instead, we should focus on whether and how the problems of 
moving ahead can be met and how the options can be best analysed and 
fostered.  
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